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The weak domestic base of South Africa’s good global citizenship
Deon Geldenhuys*
University of Johannesburg, South Africa
The self-appointed role of good international citizen that South Africa has played
since 1994 is the external corollary of its supposed good governance at home.
Weaknesses in domestic governance have, however, been evident since early in
the life of democratic South Africa. These problems have become more acute,
and internal dissatisfaction with and external awareness of ‘poor service delivery’
in South Africa have grown since 2009 when Jacob Zuma became president. The
article illustrates that South Africa fails to meet core criteria of good governance
and considers the implications of weak governance for the Republic’s good
international citizenship.
Keywords: South African foreign policy; good governance; good international
citizenship
Introduction
‘Something is rotten in the state of contemporary SA [South Africa]’, ran the headline
of an opinion piece by Gerrit Olivier in a local newspaper in November 2012. ‘The
country is losing its way’, Olivier lamented, ‘the abnormal has become “normal”,
mediocrity and underperformance are the benchmark’ and the ruling elite has
created ‘a huge and corrupt reward system’. Noting the interconnectedness of dom-
estic politics and international relations, Olivier was especially concerned about ‘the
negative effect of what is happening on the home front on South Africa’s foreign
image’.1
South Africa is no stranger to the dictum that foreign policy begins at home.
Apartheid had reduced white-ruled South Africa to the ‘permanent status as the
world’s polecat’, to quote the celebrated expression coined by Die Burger in 1960.2
That position lasted until 1994, when apartheid gave way to black majority rule
through a negotiated settlement. The new constitutional dispensation sanctioned
not merely democratic governance, but good governance more broadly. These exemp-
lary features and the saintly presidential presence of Nelson Mandela provided a solid
domestic base and the self-confidence to pursue an ambitious, moralistic foreign
policy. The international community in turn expected the ‘new’ South Africa – in
whose liberation they had invested heavily over decades – to act as a paragon
among states. South Africa obliged by donning the mantle of a good international
citizen. Since this role was anchored in its domestic political order, South Africa’s vir-
tuous global citizenship since 1994 can be regarded as the external corollary of its com-
mitment to democracy and good governance at home.3
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Olivier’s suggestion that South Africa’s good governance has fallen on hard times
was shared by other commentators. He evidently took his cue from highly critical
articles on South Africa that had appeared shortly before in two prominent Western
newspapers. ‘South Africa falters as unrest spreads’, read the caption of an article
in the Wall Street Journal. The labour unrest in the Republic’s mining industry
together with countrywide protests over the lack of public services were ‘exposing a
stark reality’, the newspaper recorded: ‘South Africa is falling behind, even in
Africa’ in the areas of poverty, unemployment and inequality.4 In a leading article
entitled ‘Cry, the beloved country’, The Economist conveyed much the same
message. In contrast to the rest of the African continent ‘clawing its way up’, South
Africa ‘is on the slide both economically and politically’. The Economist diagnosed
the ‘incompetence and outright corruption’ of the ruling African National Congress
(ANC) as the main causes of ‘South Africa’s sad decline’.5
At about the same time that Olivier’s article appeared, a group of local church
leaders (including Anglican Archbishop Thabo Makgoba) took the ANC leadership
to task for ‘bad governance’ marked by corruption, mediocrity and decay. In an
open letter the clergy urged the ruling party to build ‘a culture of good governance’.
Leaders unwilling to rise to the challenge, the letter-writers advised, should ‘step
aside and make way for others who are able to reimagine what a healthy democracy
in South Africa will look like’.6 Unlike Olivier, the clerics did not allude to the
effects that poor domestic governance may have on the country’s international
reputation.
What had, however, been harming South Africa’s international standing at the
time, was its failure to ‘walk’ the human rights ‘talk’ in its own foreign relations.
During its first stint as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in
2007–2008, South Africa refused to support resolutions condemning serial human
rights violators like Iran, Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Sudan.7 A Human Rights
Watch officer regretted that South Africa ‘often aligns with global enemies of
human rights’,8 while The Economist deplored the country’s ‘see-no-evil foreign
policy’ that tarnished its record as ‘a shining beacon of human rights’.9 For two Amer-
ican observers, democratic South Africa’s ‘friendliness toward odious dictatorships’
resembled that of its ‘infamous predecessor’.10 Other analysts branded the Republic
a ‘rogue democracy’ for the international company it kept.11 These commentators
clearly saw a contradiction between South Africa’s record at the UN and the lofty pol-
itical ideals South Africa proclaimed abroad (as befitted a good global citizen) and
also upheld at home (notably democracy and human rights). What they and other
critics evidently overlook is the weakness of a critical domestic element of the Repub-
lic’s good international citizenship, namely its quality of governance.
Against this backdrop the present article’s principal aim, to which the bulk of the
inquiry is devoted, is to illustrate that South Africa’s standards of domestic governance
fall short of core criteria of good governance. Second, it will be argued that the Repub-
lic’s poor governance undermines its self-proclaimed good international citizenship.
Although contradictions between external ambition and internal achievement have
been evident since the early days of the ‘new’ South Africa,12 the discrepancies have
become pronounced since Jacob Zuma’s presidency began in May 2009. This article
will therefore focus on Zuma’s period in office. Finally, consideration will be given
to how South Africa could bring consistency between its domestic governance and
global citizenship.
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The parameters of the investigation should be stated clearly. It is essentially a study
of the domestic sources of South Africa’s foreign policy, highlighting those elements
that have a bearing on its good international citizenship. Some foreign policy impli-
cations of weak governance performance will also be explored. The article is therefore
not another wide-ranging examination of the theory and practice of good inter-
national citizenship or of good governance, nor of South Africa’s ethical foreign
policy in general.13
To start, the concepts of good governance and good international citizenship
should be clarified, and the link between the two notions and their appropriation
and application by South Africa’s rulers need to be explained. Thereafter the deficits
in the country’s domestic governance will be investigated.
Good governance
The World Bank introduced the term ‘good governance’ in a 1989 report on sustain-
able growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Since then scores of states and some multilateral
organisations have embraced good governance as a universally applicable formula for
the ‘exercise of power or authority to manage a country’s resources and affairs’, as the
UN Development Programme defined ‘governance’ in 1997.14 The first criterion of
good governance, according to Good Governance Africa, is that ‘citizens must have
a say in how the country is run’, which in turn requires democracy, accountability,
transparency and inclusiveness. Second, the rule of law (including an independent
judiciary and an incorruptible police force) and human, civil, minority and property
rights need to be observed and enforced by ‘a legitimate government with separate,
independent branches of power’. Third, the government ‘should pursue inclusive,
growth-oriented policies’ to improve human well-being (health, education and life
expectancy).15 Finally, the civil service and public services need to be effective and effi-
cient, according to Van Doeveren.16
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, does not use the term ‘good
governance’, but contains provisions fully consistent with the above tenets. Most
importantly, the founding provisions (Article 1) declare that South Africa is a demo-
cratic state based on ‘values’ like human rights and freedoms; supremacy of the con-
stitution and the rule of law; ‘a multi-party system of democratic government’, and
‘accountability, responsiveness and openness’. One of the principles of cooperative
government, enumerated in Article 41, obligates the national, provincial and local
spheres of government to ‘provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent
government for the Republic as a whole’. In like vein the values and principles govern-
ing public administration (Article 195) include efficient, economic and effective use of
resources; development-oriented public administration; the provision of services in an
impartial, fair, equitable and unbiased fashion; accountability in public adminis-
tration; and the fostering of transparency ‘by providing the public with timely, acces-
sible and accurate information’.
In 1998 the Presidential Review Commission presented a report to President
Mandela on the reform and transformation of South Africa’s public service. The
report was, instructively, entitled Developing a Culture of Good Governance.17 Succes-
sive South African governments have since 1994 embraced the notion of good govern-
ance, often in the broader African context. In 1997 Mandela spoke of ‘Africa’s rebirth’
(also styled an African renaissance), which he said required a commitment by African
countries to ‘the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, and for the basic
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tenets of good governance’.18 In like vein President Thabo Mbeki in 2007 acknowl-
edged that ‘good governance and respect for human rights’ were fundamental to
ensuring that the masses of African people across the continent ‘escape from the
clutches of poverty, underdevelopment and dehumanisation’.19 In 2011, Minister of
International Relations and Cooperation Maite Nkoane-Mashabane affirmed that
‘democracy and good governance have to continue to spread and flourish on our con-
tinent for Africa to occupy its place this century’.20
The link between good governance and development has also been made explicit in
the ruling party’s support, since the early 2000s, for the notion of a (democratic) devel-
opmental state.21 The ANC’s 2009 election manifesto stated unequivocally that the
developmental state ‘will play a central and strategic role in the economy’ and
pledged to create ‘a more effective government’ to ‘ensure effective service delivery’.22
The main characteristics generally attributed to a developmental state include the
prioritisation of rapid and sustainable economic growth; a relatively autonomous,
meritocratic and capable bureaucracy; the development of human capital and social
infrastructure by giving priority to education and health; and embedded autonomy,
meaning social ties that bind the state to society and create channels for the
ongoing negotiation of public policies.23
The National Development Plan (NDP) of 2011 devotes an entire chapter to
‘Building a capable and developmental state’ to bring about economic and social
transformation in South Africa and so address the dual challenges of poverty and
inequality. Building state capacity to deliver ‘consistently high-quality services’, the
NDP acknowledged, ‘is the most important step to achieve a developmental state’.
The report furthermore recognised the importance of constructing a capable develop-
mental state ‘within a vibrant democratic system’.24
Several elements of good governance feature in these statements on a democratic
developmental state. Apart from the critical element of a democratic political order
and the associated aspects of rule of law, human rights and accountability, both
agendas call for building efficient and stable public institutions and improving state
capacity to enhance institutional performance and hence service delivery on the
ground.25 In short, good governance is a cornerstone of a democratic developmental
state.
Good international citizenship
Although the concept of ‘good international citizenship’ may have been pioneered by
Canada’s governor-general in 1967,26 former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth
Evans (in office 1988–1996) popularised the notion and gave political and intellectual
content to this particular form of ethical statecraft. Still, there is no single, generally
accepted definition of good international citizenship.27 Setting the bar quite high, a
good international citizen among states has been conceived as a law-abiding
member of the world community that: (1) champions a rule-governed international
order; (2) meets its international obligations; (3) values multilateral cooperation for
the common good; (4) places the welfare of the international community above the
uncompromising pursuit of national interests; and (5) promotes democracy, human
rights and other aspects of good governance as a logical extension of its fundamental
national values and best practices.28
As Evans put it, good international citizenship ‘is the area of foreign policy in
which community values most influence the pursuit of national interests’.29
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Emanating from the principles of democracy, human rights and good governance,
good international citizenship thus ‘brings together domestic politics and foreign
policy’. An implication of this linkage, Wheeler and Dunne point out, is that ‘a gov-
ernment which espouses these values abroad must have a good track record on these
issues at home’.30 If not, the government concerned could be accused of hypocrisy –
professing standards contradicted by actual conduct – and so compromising its credi-
bility.31 And credibility, Evans maintained, ‘is, simply, the most important asset a
country can have in the pursuit of good international citizenship’. Hence his insistence
that the fundamental obligation of good international citizenship ‘is to ensure that our
own house [in this case Australia] is in order before we raise issues on the international
scene’; the domestic record on matters like democracy, human rights and quality of
governance comes into the picture.32 By stressing the domestic politics–foreign
policy nexus, advocates of good international citizenship broaden the understanding
of the domestic sources of foreign policy to include not only the type of government
but also its quality (i.e. good or poor governance).33 Virtuous global citizens after
all try to globalise their domestic virtues, of which good governance is a key element.34
Understood in this way, exemplary international citizenship involves far more than
a high international standing or a good reputation; the state actor tries to influence
others through its own example, thus drawing on its soft power resources. As originally
conceived by Nye, soft power refers to a state’s ability to influence others through
appeal and attraction.35 Good governance can be regarded as a form of soft power
that gives the particular state the credibility to promote these standards
internationally.
It must be acknowledged that not all states practising good governance at home
necessarily assume the role of good global citizens. Conversely, states suffering poor
domestic governance may well subscribe to much of the multilateral agenda cham-
pioned by good international citizens like Australia, the UK and Sweden.
Democratic South Africa immediately embraced the letter and spirit of good inter-
national citizenship and acknowledged its link with good governance. In an address to
the UN Security Council in May 1994 shortly after the ANC came to power, Mbeki,
then deputy president, gave notice that South Africa ‘as a responsible citizen of the
world’ would ‘live up to its obligations’ in promoting international peace, security
and stability.36 In its foreign policy the new South Africa also from the outset propa-
gated human rights, multilateralism, a rules-based international order, the peaceful
resolution of conflict and nuclear non-proliferation, among other themes typically
associated with exemplary global citizenship.37 Having by its own account met inter-
national expectations by playing ‘a meaningful role in the region, on the continent and
globally’ in advancing ‘values of human rights, democracy, reconciliation and the era-
dication of poverty and underdevelopment’, in the words of the 2011 white paper on
South Africa’s foreign policy, the Republic donned the mantle of ‘a good international
citizen’.38 The quality of the Republic’s internal governance – a building block of its
good global citizenship – will now be investigated.
South Africa’s domestic governance I: International comparisons
South Africa has for 20 years now been formally committed to the practice of good
governance at home and the role of a virtuous citizen internationally, and has
acknowledged that these are interdependent assignments. The country’s title to
good governance is, however, being undermined by serious deficiencies in key areas
South African Journal of International Affairs 415
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of governance, notably in providing public goods relating to welfare and security and
ensuring clean and accountable government. Two sets of facts and figures will illustrate
these weaknesses, without claiming to present a definitive evaluation of South Africa’s
quality of governance. The first, recorded in this section, are comparative international
indices of aspects of governance. They are chosen because rankings and ratings that
assess the performance of states are, as Cooley found, ‘playing an increasingly impor-
tant role in the domains of international relations and public policy’.39 In the next
section, selected problem areas of government service delivery will be examined.
For the sake of brevity, only recent data will feature in the two sections.
The Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance uses 95 indicators grouped into
four categories, namely safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustain-
able economic opportunity, and human development. Scoring ranges from 0 to 100.
From 2010 to 2014 South Africa’s overall score remained remarkably consistent at
around 73. In the latter year the Republic ranked fourth out of 52 African states,
behind Mauritius, Cape Verde and Botswana. The weakest of South Africa’s four
‘pillars’ of governance has for some years now been safety and the rule of law; in
2014 its score of 68.1 in that category placed it eighth in the continent.40
The World Bank in its Worldwide Governance Indicators focuses on voice and
accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness;
regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. The scores, ranging from
−2.5 to 2.5 (best), were based on perceptions. In the 2012 survey, South Africa’s
average for the six categories was 0.20, placing it on par with Seychelles and fifth
out of 54 African states. In the category for political stability and absence of violence
South Africa scored 0, and it scored −0.15 for control of corruption. Mauritius, with
0.83 overall, was top of the African league.41
The UN Development Plan’s Human Development Index (HDI) – measuring life
expectancy, education and income – in 2013 calculated South Africa’s HDI value as
0.658 (compared with 0.654 in 2012), placing the country at 118 out of 187 and
hence in the category of medium human development. South Africa found itself
behind seven other African states, four of which – Algeria, Tunisia, Seychelles and
Mauritius – fell into the league of high human development. Life expectancy in
South Africa stood at 56.9 years in 2013 (down from 61.4 in 1995) compared with
73.6 in Mauritius and 75.9 in Tunisia.42
In the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index (renamed the Fragile States Index in
2014), South Africa consistently scored around 67 (120 = least stable) between 2009
and 2014. Only three African states were better placed than South Africa, namely
Mauritius (46.1 in 2014), Seychelles (63.7 in that year) and Botswana (64.5).43 Glob-
ally, in contrast, South Africa’s overall ranking was 115 out of 178 countries in the
2014 index. South Africa ended up in the ‘warning’ category, more or less on par
with Ukraine, Macedonia and Malaysia. Six social and economic indicators and six
political and military indicators are used to compile the Fragile States Index.44
South Africa’s recent rankings in the Global Peace Index confirm that it faces
severe problems of governance. It was placed 122 out of 162 countries in both 2013
and 2014 (wedged between Eritrea and Mauritania in 2013 and immediately behind
Niger in 2014). These findings left South Africa in the middle (‘medium’) of five cat-
egories of peace.45 As the 2014 report explained, South Africa ‘is categorically not a
peaceful state’. Conflict in the preceding five years was driven by ‘poverty, inequality,
and the slow pace of reform by government’, hence the high incidence of crime, violent
strikes and political confrontation.46
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The Global Competitiveness Index, compiled by the World Economic Forum,
rests on 12 pillars that include infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health
and primary education, higher education and training, and labour market efficiency.
On a scale of 1–7 (most competitive), South Africa scored 4.37 in 2013–2014 and
ranked 53 out of 144 countries, making it the second highest placed African state
behind Mauritius. In the 2014–2015 index South Africa dropped to the 56th position
(out of 144 states) with a score of 4.35. The individual pillars where South Africa’s
rankings were below its overall placing of 56 in 2014–2015, are infrastructure (60th
position), macro-economic environment (89), health and primary education (132),
higher education and training (86), labour market efficiency (113) and technological
readiness (66).47
One reason for including The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom
is the assumption of a correlation between economic freedom and prosperity. Another
is that this index measures freedom from corruption, government spending (and debt),
business freedom and labour freedom among its 10 ‘economic freedoms’. On a scale of
0–100 (absolutely free), South Africa’s overall scores and rankings were 62.7 (70th out
of 179 countries) in 2012; 61.8 (74th out of 177) in 2013; 62.5 (75th out of 178) in 2014;
and 62.6 (72th out of 178) in 2015. These scores place South Africa in the ‘moderately
free’ category, mostly behind a handful of other African countries (Botswana,
Rwanda, Cape Verde and Ghana). Consider the 2015 report’s observation on South
Africa: ‘Pervasive corruption jeopardises the rule of law. Rigid labour market regu-
lations and the inefficient regulatory framework perpetuate high unemployment and
underemployment’.48
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index reveals that South
Africa’s record was again respectable in African terms, but far from exemplary on
the global plane (see Table 1). Scored on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very
clean), these findings provide a comparative perspective on corruption in South
Africa.49
A big discrepancy between South Africa’s ranking globally and continentally is
also evident in the Rule of Law Index compiled by the World Justice Project. Eight
indicators are used, including absence of corruption, order and security, open govern-
ment, regulatory enforcement, and criminal justice. In 2014 South Africa’s overall
score was 0.55 (1 = best), placing it at 40 out of 99 states surveyed worldwide, but
third among the 21 African states included (beaten by Botswana and Ghana, while
Mauritius was omitted).50
A less conventional international survey to gauge government performance, but
increasingly relevant in this day and age, is the biennial Environmental Performance
Index (EPI) compiled by the Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy and the
Center for International Science Information Network at Columbia University in
Table 1. Transparency international scores for South Africa, 2012–2014
Year Countries surveyed SA score SA rank globally SA rank Africa
2012 176 43 69 8
2013 177 42 72 8
2014 175 44 67 8
Source: Transparency International Annual Reports 2012, 2013, 2014, www.transparency.org/cpi
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collaboration with the World Economic Forum. The EPI applies 22 performance indi-
cators in 10 ‘policy categories’ that include environmental health, air pollution and
water resources. Scoring ranges from 100 to 0. In 2010 South Africa’s score of 50.8
gave it a ranking of 115 out of 163 countries, placing it behind 19 other African
states. By 2014 South Africa’s overall score had risen to 53.51 and its overall
ranking jumped to 72 out of 178 countries. Over a 10-year period South Africa’s
environmental performance had improved by over 6%, but in 2014 it still lagged
behind four fellow African states.51
Although the focus of this section was on weaknesses in South Africa’s public
service delivery, it is worth noting how it fared in rankings of democracy and
human rights; these are, after all, key components of the good governance agenda
and areas in which South Africa is generally believed to excel. The annual Democracy
Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit is based on the rating for 60 indicators
organised in five categories, including the functioning of government. South Africa
in 2010, 2011 and 2012 attained an overall score of 7.79, on a scale of 0–10, improving
to 7.90 in 2013. In the latter year South Africa was ranked 29 out of 167 countries,
dropping from 31 out of 167 in 2012. All these scores placed South Africa in the cat-
egory of ‘flawed democracies’, behind Botswana and Cape Verde. Mauritius was the
only African state to be classified among the ‘full democracies’ in 2012 and 2013.52
In Freedom House’s Freedom in the World index (where a score of 1 denotes free
and 7 not free), South Africa received a score of 2 for both political rights and civil
liberties in 2013, placing it in the ‘free’ category. Cameroon, Gambia and Mauritius
scored 1 on political rights, and five other states also earned 2 for political rights. In
the field of civil liberties South Africa was again beaten by Cameroon and kept the
company of seven other African countries with a ranking of 2.53
A clear pattern emerges from the various comparative indices: South Africa fares
well in the African context but poorly on a wider international stage. The Republic
typically ranks among the five best governed African states (behind the likes of Maur-
itius and Botswana) but in universal terms its performance is mediocre. These con-
clusions hold true even when allowing for the divergence in findings among the
many indices owing to their different methodologies. Expressed in terms of soft
power, it could be said that South Africa’s quality-of-governance resource would be
rated highly within Africa, but decidedly modestly at the global level. Unsurprisingly,
South Africa does not feature in Portland’s new (2015) ‘ranking of the strength of
national soft power resources’. In fact, not a single African country appears among
the top 30 states in any of the five categories used for this composite index (digital,
culture, enterprise, global engagement, education and government). 54
South Africa’s domestic governance II: selected problem areas
Eight critical areas have been selected to illustrate current deficiencies in governance in
South Africa. Most of them have been touched upon in the comparative indices
recorded above, but here they are examined more closely. The problem areas are
public administration; poverty, inequality and unemployment; crime; education; elec-
tricity; water; ecology; and wildlife.
Serious deficits in government performance at national, provincial and municipal
levels are detailed in the annual reports of the auditor-general. In the 2011–2012 finan-
cial year, the auditor-general recorded, only 22% of over 500 government agencies
investigated received a clean (unqualified) audit; a mere three out of 38 national
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departments fell in this category.55 An official audit of 469 government departments
and public entities for the period 2013–2014 revealed an increase (over the previous
financial year) in unauthorised and irregular expenditure; the total involved was
around $6.2 billion (SAR65 billion). Of the institutions then audited, only 25%
received a clean bill of health. The worst offenders were the departments responsible
for providing key public services: health, education, human settlements and public
works.56
The quality of municipal governance has been even worse than that at national and
provincial levels. The number of municipalities receiving unqualified audits from the
auditor-general stood at 13 (out of 283 municipalities) in the 2010–2011 financial
year, and the amount misspent or wasted was $1.4 billion (R14.6 billion).57 The
auditor-general’s report for 2011–2012 recorded a marginal increase to nine clean
audits among the existing 278 municipalities, still a woeful 3% of the total.58 In the
2012–2013 financial year, 22 (9%) of 319 municipalities and other local entities
received clean audits. Audit findings for 2013–2014 revealed that irregular and
unauthorised expenditure and wastage by municipalities ran into more than $2.2
billion (R23 billion).59 According to the auditor-general the main reasons for the
lack of clean audits included the appointment of unqualified personnel to manage
municipal finances, a failure to rectify such problems, and the absence of consequences
for wrongdoing.60
Specific mention should be made of the persistent financial and operational crises
and corruption scandals plaguing state-owned enterprises. Eskom (the power utility),
South African Airways, the Post Office, the Passenger Rail Agency (Prasa), the South
African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and Telkom, among others, have become
what a journalist described as ‘a sorry spectacle of sleaze, malfunction and underper-
formance, giving credence to those who assert that these entities are a lucrative site for
looting on a grand scale’.61
Poverty, inequality and unemployment are, in the government’s view, the three
critical domestic issues to be addressed. Progress since 1994 has been modest at
best, even allowing for the legacy of apartheid and international factors beyond
South Africa’s control, especially the state of the world economy.
The proportion of South Africans living in relative poverty (people in households
with incomes less than the poverty income for the particular year) declined from a
peak of 49.1% in 2002 to 39.7% in 2010 and 35.9% in 2012; in the latter year
18 777 566 people of all races fell in this category. The proportions by race (2012) dif-
fered profoundly: under 1% for whites; 11% for Indians; over 24% for ‘coloureds’; and
nearly 42% for black Africans.62
South Africa’s Gini coefficient, a measurement of income inequality on a scale of
0–100 (the latter representing total inequality), has remained virtually unchanged at
around 62–63 between 2008 and 2013. The Republic compares poorly with other
countries at the medium level of human development like Indonesia (34) and Egypt
(30.8), and with its BRICS partners Brazil (54.7), India (33.4) and Russia (40.1).63
As regards unemployment, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators of
2014 recorded that 25% of South Africa’s total labour force had been unemployed
in the period 2008–2012.64 In mid-2015 the official unemployment rate stood at
26.4% or 5.5 million people; when those who had given up searching for employment
were added, the figure was 36.1%.65 Unemployment among the youth (15–24 years
old) typically exceeds 50%.66 The International Labour Organization in January
2015 predicted that South Africa would feature among the 10 countries with the
South African Journal of International Affairs 419
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Jo
ha
nn
es
bu
rg
] a
t 2
1:1
5 0
1 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
16
 
highest unemployment rates during that year: at 25% South Africa ranked eighth, with
Mauritania in the worst position with an expected 30.9% unemployment.67 Its rela-
tively high unemployment was the main reason for South Africa occupying the
eighth highest position (out of 89 countries) in the 2013 Misery Index compiled by
Harvard professor Steve Hanke,68 and third highest in the 2015 Bloomberg index of
economic misery.69
The Republic has the dubious reputation of being one of the most crime-ridden
countries in the world. Its crime profile displays some rather unique features. First,
it is the only country in which the murder rate exceeds the road death toll.70
Second, South Africa is one of only 16 countries (out of 188) in which violence is
among the five main causes of death; the other 15 countries are in South America
and the Caribbean.71 A third distinguishing feature is the degree of violence involved
in crime in South Africa: 37% of all reported crimes are violent, including murder, rape
and grievous assault – a figure far exceeding that in most other states.72 Fourth,
although South Africa may not be exceptional in this respect, the low rate of prosecu-
tion of crimes is a further disturbing feature of the crime situation. According to South
African Police Service (SAPS) data released in 2011, only 52% of crimes reported to
the police were solved and a mere 31% of these cases ended up in a court of law.
The respective figures for murder and armed robbery were even lower.73
In the 2011–2012 financial year, 30.9 people per 100 000 were murdered in South
Africa. The year 2012–2013 saw an increase to 31.1 and a further rise to 32.2 per
100 000 in 2013–2014. The actual number of murders stood at 17 068 in 2013–2014,
according to SAPS figures.74 In comparative terms, South Africa has the eighth
highest murder rate per 100 000 people, a 2012 United Nations report revealed.75
Official figures for rape are much higher than those for murder: 100 per 100 000
people in 2009–2010; 98.5 in 2010–2011; and 94.9 in 2011–2012.76 In the latter
period, according to SAPS statistics, 48 003 rapes were reported to the police. The
Medical Research Council, however, estimated that 1.2 million people were raped in
South Africa in 2011–2012. This figure translated into 3 287 rapes per day. Equally
worrying was the state’s poor record in prosecuting alleged rapists. The Tshwareng
Legal Advocacy Centre calculated that in only 50.5% of the 48 003 reported rape
cases in 2011–12 were suspects arrested; of these incidents, 17.3% led to court trials;
and a mere 4.1% of the cases ended in convictions.77
Education is another area in which the state remains sorely deficient notwithstand-
ing impressive advances in access to primary, secondary and tertiary education for
black South Africans since 1994. One is the problem of learner throughput. Of the
1.26 million learners in grade 1 in public schools in 2002, a mere 34.8% obtained
their matric certificates in 2013.78 The corresponding throughput rate for the grade
1 class of 2003, passing matric in 2014, increased to around 45%.79 A further
problem is the quality of education. The World Economic Forum’s competitiveness
index highlighted the weakness of South Africa’s primary school education, which
earned a dismal 133rd position out of 144 countries in 2014.80
South Africa’s frequent electricity blackouts, or load-shedding to use the official
euphemism, come at a high price for the economy. The Department of Public Enter-
prises informed Parliament in March 2015 that load-shedding by the state-owned
power utility costs the economy anywhere between R20 billion and R80 billion per
month.81 Eskom’s shortcomings were not confined to its inability to keep South
Africa’s lights on. A lack of confidence in the company’s corporate governance and
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credit profile caused Standard & Poor’s Financial Services to downgrade Eskom’s
credit rating to junk status (from BBB− to BB+) in March 2015.82
Water is another basic commodity under threat. Being semi-arid, South Africa
counts among the 30 driest countries in the world.83 Fully 98% of available water
supplies are already being used. However, 37% of fresh water is being lost owing to
decaying infrastructure, lack of maintenance, poor management and persistent
wastage, the Department of Water and Sanitation reported in 2014.84 (Unofficial esti-
mates put the loss of clean, drinkable water at between 50 and 70%.85) In addition,
according to official figures, almost 40% of the country’s waste water treatment was
in a ‘critical state’ – causing the discharge of polluted water into rivers used by poor
communities and for crop irrigation.86 There have not surprisingly been dire warnings
of South Africa facing imminent ‘water-shedding’ alongside the deprivations of (elec-
tricity) load-shedding.87
The ecology also suffers from official acts of omission and commission. In 2012 the
government’s draft national water resource strategy revealed that fully 60% of South
Africa’s 223 river ecosystems were under threat and 25% were critically endangered.88
A serial offender in the destruction or pollution of water systems is the mining indus-
try, which appears to violate official mining conditions with relative impunity.89
Staying with the natural environment, reference must be made to rhino poaching
in South Africa. The total number of rhino poaching deaths in South Africa (with the
number killed in the iconic Kruger National Park in brackets) for five successive years
is as follows: 2010, 333 (146); 2011, 448 (252); 2012, 668 (425); 2013, 1004 (606); and
2014, 1215 (672). Over the same period the number of arrests of alleged rhino poachers
increased from 165 (2010) to 386 (2014), but this is scant compensation for the seem-
ingly unstoppable wholesale slaughter of these animals for their horns.90
Given the stubborn problems of poverty, inequality and unemployment on the one
hand and the underperformance of the public sector on the other, it is not surprising
that service delivery protests have been a feature of the South African scene since 2004.
Before then, public protests were organised mostly by social movements, but from
2004 whole communities began ‘rising up in rebellion’,91 turning South Africa into
the ‘protest capital of the world’.92 According to police figures, 33 521 protests
occurred between 2009 and 2012, over 3 000 of them violent.93 Official statistics
recorded that the police responded to 10 517 peaceful and 1 882 violent protest
actions in 2012–2013; the respective figures for 2013–2014 were 11, 601 and 1 907.94
Dealing with dissonance
It would be disingenuous and factually incorrect to suggest that the story of govern-
ance in South Africa since 1994 is one of decline only. There has been commendable
progress in providing public services to millions of previously disadvantaged South
Africans. Equally important, the discrimination and oppression of apartheid have
been replaced by universal human rights and freedoms. In many respects ‘South
Africa has a good story to tell’, to quote a favourite slogan of the Zuma government.95
Yet the achievements cannot mask the fact that democratic South Africa has long been
experiencing poor governance over a broad front. It is fair to say that the standards of
domestic governance since 1994 have never been as good as South Africa’s rulers
would have liked to convince the world. The Republic could, however, for some
years draw on a set of extenuating circumstances: the legacy of apartheid; universal
euphoria showered on newly liberated South Africa; foreign and local tolerance of
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the ‘teething problems’ of a new and inexperienced black ruling elite; and of course the
Mandela factor. The post-apartheid dividends, as Olivier’s article and those in the
Wall Street Journal, The Economist and The Times suggested, have over time waned
if not vanished. South Africa’s lack of good governance is being unveiled to the
world for what it is: a serious dereliction of duty by its rulers. As a result, an important
South African soft power resource is being diminished.
Cynics may well dismiss South Africa’s governance deficits as par for the course in
Africa; predictably, on this view, the Republic is turning into another stereotypical
African state where poor governance is the rule rather than the exception. An exten-
sion of this opinion is that their domestic weaknesses do not constrain other African
countries in pursuing grand foreign policy objectives like changing the distribution of
power and wealth in the world. Why should South Africa be any different?
Such attitudes can be challenged on several grounds. First, they are deterministic
and defeatist; a core group of African states shows that relatively good national gov-
ernance is not beyond the reach of the continent. African governments also owe it to
their peoples to improve standards of governance and in democracies the voters are
moreover legally empowered to demand effective, responsive and accountable govern-
ance. Second, South Africa’s government is constitutionally obligated to meet the stan-
dards of good governance and has reaffirmed this commitment in policy statements.
Third, the Republic consistently portrays itself as an exemplary state, based in large
measure on its supposedly miraculous democratic rebirth in 1994 and on Mandela
‘magic’ (first his presidency and thereafter his legacy). In 1996 the (then named)
Department of Foreign Affairs spoke glowingly of the new South Africa’s ‘unique
moral authority’ in the world.96 Nearly a decade later the department still invoked
the Republic’s ‘particular moral authority’, said to be derived from the country’s ‘prin-
ciples, policies and priorities’ – presumably domestic and foreign.97 This is not the
language of the lowest common denominator, but instead an assertion of exceptional-
ism. The claim to unique moral authority – which incidentally confirms that South
Africa’s foreign policy is an extension of its domestic policies and practices – should
be read together with the earlier quoted 2011 White Paper on South Africa’s foreign
policy, which extolled the country’s role in promoting human rights, democracy and
reconciliation elsewhere. True, the new South Africa faced high external expectations
of exemplary conduct at home and abroad, but these were matched by the country’s
self-proclaimed grand designs in the two domains.
How, then, can South Africa from a policy perspective deal with the dissonance
between internal performance and external aspiration? There are at least four options.
The first is to soldier on. Just as all states fail to live up to moral standards they set
themselves, South Africa is not perfect either. The crucial consideration, under this
option, is that the country’s intentions are honourable: it has a solemn commitment
to good governance, has made considerable progress in this direction, acknowledges
at least some of its failings and works to rectify them. By facing up to its weaknesses,
South Africa is moreover setting an example to others. The Republic can therefore in
good conscience carry on with its good international citizenship, with the promotion
of good governance abroad remaining part of the package. Because the cracks in the
domestic base of its ambitious foreign policy – and hence the erosion of its soft power –
may be temporary and repairable, the country’s exemplary global citizenship should
remain intact.
The second possible response is for South Africa to ‘take time out’ to get its house
in order. This option is based on a simple principle articulated byWheeler and Dunne:
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‘States which speak the language of good international citizenship will be mistrusted if
they do not uphold principles of democratic governance at home’.98 Such countries
would also expose themselves to charges of hypocrisy. Under the second option demo-
cratic governance is not detached from the other elements of good governance; they
are still treated as interconnected. While working to improve its standards of domestic
governance, South Africa should suspend or at least moderate its advocacy of good
governance abroad. Once the country improves its rankings in Africa and the world
at large in the various indices measuring aspects of governance, it can (re)claim the
moral high ground that a credible good international citizen needs. The remedial
action should then enhance South Africa’s soft power resource of effective and effi-
cient governance. Incidentally, in following this course South Africa will in effect
acknowledge that international rankings ‘are designed to exert normative pressures
on states to promote change in a country’s performance or improve some aspect of
its domestic institutions or policymaking’.99
South Africa could in the third place choose to realign its international ambitions
with its defective standards of internal governance. Many of the indices discussed
earlier rank South Africa highly in an African context but modestly on the world
stage. Instead of playing the part of a good global citizen, South Africa could lower
its sights to being a good African citizen. The Republic is well placed for the role:
although flawed, its domestic governance is still far superior to that of 90% of
African countries. This option would not require a major change of course for
South Africa since the continent has long been the focal point of its foreign policy
and Pretoria has sufficient soft and hard power resources to assume a leading political
role in Africa.
The fourth response would see South Africa continue playing a prominent role on
the global stage but in a different guise. Instead of being driven by a desire for (or the
vocation of) good international citizenship as an extension of its domestic political
order, South Africa’s international role would be built on its status as a regional
power or hegemon. With it comes ‘a set of privileges, obligations and responsibil-
ities’100 that are fully compatible with South Africa’s existing revisionist international
agenda. That agenda includes major reforms to the system of global political and
financial governance, a quest that will align South Africa closer with the countries
of the global South and distance it from Western powers.101 This option amounts to
a renunciation of the role of good international citizen and would by the same
token free South Africa of the domestic prerequisite of clean and efficient governance.
The Republic could, however, retain some lofty tasks associated with good inter-
national citizenship, like participating in multilateral peacemaking and peacekeeping
efforts and supporting disarmament. At the same time South Africa could place
increasing emphasis on the promotion of typical national interests like wealth and
security through its foreign policy (rather than championing higher values such as
democracy, human rights and good governance).102
Conclusion
The preceding analysis leads to three main conclusions. The first is that charges of
poor governance in South Africa, levelled by Olivier and several others mentioned
in the introduction, are substantiated by international indices of government perform-
ance and a range of problem areas investigated in this article. This is not to suggest
that South Africa falls short on all criteria of good governance, which include
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democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In these domains the country fares rela-
tively well internationally. Its critical weaknesses lie in the provision of public goods by
a civil service that is ineffective and inefficient. Here South Africa typically ranks
poorly in global terms but is highly rated among African countries. For as long as
the Republic portrays itself as an exemplary – even exceptional – state in Africa
and a virtuous citizen globally, its record in domestic governance deserves to be
judged on universal terms.
Second, South Africa’s deficits in government performance on the home front have
implications for its self-proclaimed role of good global citizen. Recall the observation
ofWheeler and Dunne, cited earlier, that contradictions between what a state professes
internationally and practices domestically expose it to accusations of hypocrisy. South
Africa lacks the credibility to preach good governance abroad while failing to adhere
to its critical standards at home.
South Africa could, finally, consider a number of ways of dealing with the patent
inconsistency between its domestic governance and the pursuit of exemplary inter-
national citizenship. The country is presently following the first of the four options
identified, namely business as usual on the domestic and international fronts. This
means that the policymakers do not see any need to improve governance performance
at home to a level consistent with the demands of good global citizenship (option two)
or, conversely, to scale down their external aspirations to match their internal perform-
ance (option three). Should there however be a continuous ‘depreciation of the coun-
try’s moral and political currency’103 – owing not least to poor domestic governance –
this may result in pragmatism increasingly trumping moralism in the Republic’s
foreign policy, as envisaged in the fourth option. To be sure, option four does not
mean that South Africa will abandon its aspirations to international leadership; as a
regional hegemon it can exert influence within Africa and beyond on behalf of
Africa, largely unconstrained by its failings in domestic governance.
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